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Abstract This paper investigates the effect of the board quality 
on risk reporting in specific social and cultural context of 
Saudi Arabia for a sample of 423 company-year observations 
over the period 2015-2018. The paper utilizes a comprehensive 
risk reporting index and self-constructed index of board 
quality to measure the main variables. Using pooled OLS 
regression models, our results suggest that there is a positive 
and significant relationship between the quality of the board 
of directors and risk reporting in Saudi non-financial firms. 
In addition, this finding is consistent with the disaggregation 
of the risk disclosure index into mandatory versus voluntary 
risk disclosures and the disclosure of financial and non-
financial risk disclosures. Such findings suggest that the 
quality of the board of directors helps to eliminate information 
asymmetry and agency costs. Finally, the findings of this study 
can prove to be of great value to market regulators in their 
attempts to improve the corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia and can be extended to include other countries in the 
MENA region. 
 




The wake of the global financial crisis has contributed 
to increasing interest in corporate governance practices in 
stock markets. Poor corporate governance, inefficient risk 
management and lack of risk disclosures were blamed as 
the root of the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia and the 
2001 financial crisis [1] and later the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis [2]. Inadequate transparency of business 
operations, in particular risk management, has increased the 
concern of stakeholders [3]. This has increased the demand 
of stakeholders for more transparency [4, 5].  
The board of directors is the internal governance 
structure responsible for steering a firm in the right strategic 
direction, such as risk disclosure practices. The quality of 
the board is effective in oversight role on risk disclosure [6, 
7]. The board also performs oversight functions to the 
management on behalf of shareholders, which in turn 
reduce agency costs and align the interests of the managers 
and shareholders [8, 9]. From agency theory framework, 
board of directors is one crucial method used by companies 
to resolve conflicts either between managers and 
shareholders or among [10].  Therefore, the continuation 
and success of the firms requires appointing an effective 
board of directors who could provide sufficient risk 
information and protect shareholders' interests. This 
statement highlights the importance of board quality in 
conflict resolution. Quality of board of directors may help 
to pay proper attention about the interest of all shareholders, 
as they are anticipated to monitor the managers and 
majority shareholders in order to protect the minority 
shareholders' interests. 
While there is an expanding interest in research on risk 
reporting in developing countries, most risk reporting 
literature in these countries has focused heavily on financial 
firms [11-13]. Studies conducted on risk reporting in non-
financial companies are restricted, such as [14-20], there is 
far-less study have examined the association between 
combination of these characteristics and risk reporting. 
Therefore, this study seeks to investigate the association 
between board quality and the level of risk disclosure in 
non-financial Saudi firms to widen the literature on risk 
reporting by filling out the information gap. This study 
differs from previous studies since previous studies 
examined the influence of each characteristics of the board 
on risk reporting, while this study examines the relationship 
between board quality based on a self-constructed index 
and risk reporting. Our board Index is therefore an objective 
indicator of the quality of the board of directors. 
The Saudi Arabian stock market provides an optimal 
environment to investigate the association between board 
quality and risk disclosure for a number of reasons. First, 
Saudi Arabia is at the heart of the Arab and Muslim worlds. 
Second, Saudi Arabia is a core member of the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which has 
the second largest oil reserves in the world after Venezuela. 
Third, Saudi Arabia has recently experienced rapid socio-
economic development. Saudi Arabia has developed 
policies and strategies for achieving Saudi vision 2030 to 
become a worldwide investment powerhouse, such as 
diversifying its economy and moving away from oil as the 
main economic commodity which in turn has boosted the 
economy and attracted foreign investors to the country. 
Finally, Saudi Arabia has recently increased awareness of 
corporate governance as it re-issues corporate governance 
regulations that highlight the important role of the board in 
risk reporting. Consequently, providing insight into this 
country’s corporate governance practices and their impacts 
on the transparency will help attract more investors and 
strengthen the country’s economy. 
In this research study, a hand-collected sample of 423 
firm-year observations of publicly listed non-financial 
firms in Saudi stock market over the period from 2015 to 
2018 was used. To assess the influence of board quality on 
risk disclosure, a comprehensive risk disclosure index and 
board quality index were used. Accordingly, through the 
development of a regression model, it was found that there 
is a positive and significant relationship between the quality 
of the board and risk reporting of Saudi non-financial firms. 
Furthermore, we obtained consistent results after 
disaggregated the risk reporting index into mandatory 
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versus voluntary risk disclosures and financial versus non-
financial risk disclosures. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Second 
section will provide a review of relevant literature and 
hypothesis development. Third section will describe the 
design and measurements of the research; while in fourth 
section, the results of this study are discussed. Lastly, fifth 
section offers the conclusion of conducted research. 
 
2. Literature Review  
Risk Reporting 
In [21] addresses risk reporting by covering both good 
and bad information on the firm’s uncertainties. He defined 
risk disclosure as “the financial statements inclusion of 
information about managers’ estimates, judgments, 
reliance on market-based accounting policies such as 
impairment, derivative hedging, financial instruments, and 
fair value as well as the disclosure of concentrated 
operations, non-financial information about corporations’ 
plans, recruiting strategy, and other operational, economic, 
political and financial risks.” (Hassan 2009, p. 669). In the 
light of this definition mentioned above, it can be stated that 
risk reporting is a process of reporting information on 
potential risks, either positive or negative, financial or non-
financial, related to backward-looking risk information or 
forward-looking risk information. 
 The role of risk disclosure to reduce the 
asymmetrical information as well as agency costs is proven 
by many scholars [22]. They propose the risk reporting 's 
beneficial impact in reducing the uncertainty of investors 
that could help to assess firm performance in the future. 
Improving the risk information made available to 
stockholders benefits them in financing decisions and 
investment decisions. [23] discuss the significance of risk 
disclosure in terms of its ability to reduce agency and 
information asymmetry problems that exist between 
managers and stakeholders. Thus, there is a high possibility 
to achieve the decrease of agency problem through a 
reduction in information asymmetry between managers and 
stakeholders, and consequently boost the firm's overall 
performance. Basically, identification of risks and 
opportunities protects the company from unexpected 
consequences and creates value for its stakeholders [24]. In 
addition, firms might also be interested in the disclosure of 
risk information to enable more effective communication 
with influential stakeholders, as well as gain more support 
from investors and stakeholders to achieve the identified 
goals [25]. 
 [26] imply that firms with increased systematic, 
financing and risk-adjusted return risks are more likely to 
disclose more risk information. This would help to reduce 
monitoring costs and, in addition, reduce cost of capital 
[27]. Consequently, those companies that fail to deliver 
high level of risk reporting will deal with the increase in 
capital cost due to an increased rate of return by 
shareholders. Therefore, transparency of risk information 
would minimise the investors' uncertainty and consequently 
they would reduce the cost of equity capital [28]. 
Nevertheless, [29] remind that disclosures alone will not 
generate transparency unless the information is appropriate. 
Consequence, transparency can achieve better corporate 
governance as the market disciplines firms with 
unacceptable risk levels (Linsley & Shrives, 2005). Risk 
reporting therefore provides companies with many 
advantages, such as minimizing uncertainty, enhancing 
performance, reducing cost of equity capital, and increasing 
stakeholder trust. 
 The Quality of the Board and Risk Reporting 
As a governing body of a corporation, the board of 
directors manages the business and affairs of the 
corporation. Usually, the board’s main responsibility is to 
make major business and policy decisions and appoint and 
give powers to its officers to exercise the duties on behalf 
of the board.  In other words, the role of the board to 
maintain corporate governance and oversee risk 
management of the corporation and deliver the feedback to 
the shareholders (Moumen, Othman & Hussainey, 2016). 
The empirical studies identify certain structural 
characteristics (e.g., board size, board independence, 
interlocking directors, and board meetings) that are able to 
measure the business effectiveness of the board of directors 
(e.g., Alsheikh et al., 2020, Habtoor & Ahmad, 2017, 
AlMaghzom et al., 2016). The effective and well-organized 
operations of board can enhance the informativity of risk 
reporting (Moumen et al., 2016). 
 The board size or the number of members in the 
board of directors is one of the key determinants of risk 
disclosure practices (AlMaghzom etal., 2016). 
Elshandidy&Neri (2015) support the idea larger boards are 
more effective in decreasing actual agency costs due to their 
ability to align potential conflicts of interest between 
insiders and outsiders. Further, the board's combined 
experience and expertise will increase with a large number 
of directors, and hence the need for information disclosure 
will increase (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). Based on prior 
studies, the relationship between board size and risk 
reporting is primarily significant and of a positive nature 
(e.g., Ntim etal., 2013; Saggar & Singh, 2017). However, 
AlMaghzom et al., (2016), & Habtoor & Ahmad (2017) 
found a negative relationship between board size and risk 
disclosure. 
Another major determinant of the risk reporting is 
represented by independent directors who perform neither 
management nor business or ownership role. Their 
functions are marked by the responsibility to protect the 
company's reputation for professional integrity (Allini et 
al., 2016). In terms of reporting and disclosure practices, 
there is a need for independent directors on the board in 
order to monitor the actions of other executive directors. 
The increase in the number of independent directors leads 
to increase the level of monitoring role of the board of 
directors and, hence reduces the management's chance of 
withholding information for their own benefit (Akhtaruddin 
et al., 2009). Oliveira et al. (2011) found the proportion of 
independent directors to board is positively and 
significantly related to the risk reporting, implying that the 
companies are more likely to provide more risk information 
if their boards of directors have more independent 
members. Likewise, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) and 
Probohudono et al. (2013) observed a positive and 
significant association between board independence and the 
extent of risk disclosures. These results contribute to the 
current understanding of the usefulness of the threshold of 
board independence as one of the important determinants 
of risk reporting. Nevertheless, [30] found that board 
independence has no significant impact on risk reporting. 
The insignificant effect of board independence on the risk 
reporting has been further approved by [31-34]. 
Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt    Vol. 9, No. 5, October 2020 
 
428 
Interlocking directors have more knowledge, skills, and 
experience that help to reduce the agency costs [35]. Hence, 
interlocking directors may help to enhance the monitoring 
function of the board [36-38] found that interlocking 
directors positively impact the risk reporting in the GCC 
companies. However, [39] found interlocking directors had 
no impact on risk disclosure.  Another board characteristic 
that can be considered as one of the critical determinants of 
risk disclosures is frequency of board meeting. [40] 
indicated a significant positive association between board 
meeting frequency and risk reporting. The outcome 
highlights the significant role of board meetings and their 
frequency, which can raise the board's performance within 
risk reporting practices. Furthermore, [41] found that the 
higher the frequency of the board meetings, the better 
quality of the disclosure. This shows that firms with 
frequent meetings are increasing the effective mechanism 
of corporate governance. In this context, a higher frequency 
of meetings leads in a more effective monitoring 
mechanism to enhance management's decision on 
disclosure, and, in turn, minimizes information asymmetry 
[42]. However, the study of [43] indicated an insignificant 
relationship between board meetings and risk disclosure. 
Based on the above sections, the agency theory tends to 
relate to the significance of the board characteristics (i.e., 
namely, board size, board independence, interlocking 
directors and board meetings) as risk reporting 
determinants. Further, combining these characteristics can 
be representing the effectiveness and the quality of the 
board of directors as these characteristics act in a 
complementary manner. Thus, the efficiency of the board's 
monitoring function through these characteristics may 
enhance risk disclosure level and, in turn, reduce 
information asymmetries as well as agency conflicts [44]. 
In the context of this research, we argue that the quality of 
the board plays an essential role in risk reporting. We 
conjecture that when board characteristics that improve the 
board quality increase, the level of risk reporting increases. 
Thus, the following hypothesis was developed: 
H: There is a positive relationship between board 
quality and risk reporting. 
 
3. Research Design 
Sample Selection and Data 
In this study, our sample consisted of 109 of Saudi non-
financial listed firms for the period from 2015 to 2018. The 
financial companies, such as banks, insurance, and 
financial services companies, were excluded from this 
study since they are subject to different corporate 
governance regulations which might impact the analysis. 
Moreover, financial firms have different capital structure. 
Data on risk reporting, firm governance characteristics and 
audit quality were manually taken out from the annual 
reports of the sampled firms for the period of study. With 
regards to the data on firm characteristics, such as size and 
beta, these data were collected from Datastream database.  
Table 1 presents the sample selection for this study. This 
table shows that initially there were 452 firm-year 
observations for the non-financial firms. Of these firm-year 
observations, 29 were excluded due to unavailable annual 




Table 1: Sample Selection 
Number of observation available 
for non-financial firms in UAE 
452 
Less:  
Firm-year with unavailable annual 
report and missing data in control 
variables 
(29) 
Total firm-year observations 423 
 
Dependent Variable 
Risk disclosure (RD) is the dependent variable for this 
research which represents the level of risk reporting among 
Saudi listed companies. The RD index used in this research 
is that developed by [45]. The index was developed from 
prior academic studies [24, 33], and risk-related accounting 
standards (i.e., IFRS 7: Financial Instruments Disclosures). 
The RD index is constructed based on the main risk 
categories (i.e., mandatory risk disclosures vs voluntary 
risk disclosures, and financial risk disclosures vs non-
financial risk disclosures). The unweighted RD index was 
categorized into 10 primary categories and 33 sub-items, 
each item is assigned 1 if it is disclosed, otherwise 0 . 
 Independent Variable and Control Variables 
The independent variable in this study is the quality of 
the board of directors (BoardQ). This study follows the 
steps of previous studies [26, 30] and captures the 
characteristics of the board of directors as a whole based on 
index in order to measure the quality of the board of 
directors. The unweighted index of the board quality is a 
composite measure, summing up the value of the four 
dichotomous characteristics, i.e., a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the board characteristic equals or more than 
median value and 0 otherwise. The four board 
characteristics that have been included in the index are the 
board size, board independence, interlocking directors and 
board meetings. The BoardQ score is calculated on the 
basis of the following:  
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠
 
This study included five control variables, namely, audit 
quality (AQ), firm size (Size), profitability (ROE), leverage 
(Lev), and company-level risk (Beta). Prior studies have 
proved the significant effects of these variables on RD; 
audit quality [6], firm size [17], profitability [14], leverage  
[5], and the firm’s risk factor [15]. The variables of this 
study and their measurements are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Measurements of Variables 
Variable Measurement 
RD The level of risk reporting based on index 
BoardQ Board quality based on index, which 
covers board size, board independent 
directors, interlocking directors, and board 
meetings. 
AQ A dummy variable of 1 if the firm is 
audited by one of the Big Four auditors, 0 
otherwise. 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets 
ROE Net profit scaled by total equity. 
Lev The total debt scaled over total assets. 
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Beta Systematic risk which is calculated over 
12 months by regressing the share price 
against the respective market index 
 
Statistical Model 
The relationship between the quality of the board of 
directors (independent variable) and the risk reporting 
(dependent variable) is determined through the following 
model: 
RD= β_0+ β_1 BoardQᵢᵼ +〖 β〗_2 AQᵢᵼ  +  β_3 Sizeᵢᵼ 
+ β_4 ROEᵢᵼ + β_5 Levᵢᵼ + β_6 Betaᵢᵼ + Yearᵢᵼ+INDᵢᵼ+εᵢᵼ 
  
4. Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 describes the basic characteristic of the 
considering variables that included in the regression model. 
Table 3 indicates the mean values for risk disclosure index 
(RD) is 0.697 with a standard deviation of 0.151. This 
indicates that, on average, 69.7% of the level of risk 
disclosure is disclosed. This finding shows an improvement 
in the level of risk reporting among Saudi companies 
compared to the previous study done by [17]. This finding 
indicates that there is an improvement in the risk reporting 
practices in Saudi companies as a result of compliance with 
recent corporate governance regulations. At the same time, 
the results show that there is a high variation in the RD 
practices of the Saudi firms as the minimum index value 
was 0.272 versus a maximum of 0.969, which is similar to 
the results obtained by [4] for GCC companies and [16] for 
the Saudi banks. 
 In terms of the independent variable, the mean 
value of the board quality was 54.4% with some firms 
having 0 quality of the board. However, the maximum 
value of board quality indicates that some of the firms in 
our sample had board quality up to 100%. Audit Quality 
represented by the big four audit firms (AQ) has a relatively 
lower mean of 44.9% compared to prior studies that done 
in the GCC financial firms [5]. With regard to firm 
characteristics, the descriptive statistics show that the mean 
(standard deviation) values for Size, ROE, Lev and Beta are 
20.213 (1.548), 0.055 (0.188), 0.231(0.191) and 1.099 
(0.319), respectively. This indicates that the sample 
companies' profitability is very low, with an average of 
0.055 and some companies have realized losses. Moreover, 
the average leverage ratio was 0.231, indicating a low level 
of leverage for the sample companies. Based on the level of 
risk, the sample companies have higher levels with an 
average of 1,099 compared to a market. Table 3 
demonstrates the diversity of our sample companies due to 
the dispersion of control variables. 
 
TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean S.D Min Max 
RD 423 0.697 0.151 0.272 0.969 
BoardQ 423 0.544 0.264 0 1 
Control variables      
AQ 423 0.449 0.498  0 1 
Size 423 20.213 1.548 15.445 25.542 
ROE 423 0.055 0.188 -1.911 0.584 
Lev 423 0.231 0.191 0 0.714 
Beta 423 1.099 0.280 0.431 1.819 
 
 Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
We examined the Pearson Correlation between our 
variables over the four-year period. From Table 4, it is 
evident that there is a positive and significant correlation 
between board quality and the risk reporting at level 1%. 
This means that as the board quality increases, the risk 
reporting increases. Moreover, it was found that the audit 
quality, firm size and the leverage have significant positive 
correlations with risk reporting. These results are consistent 
with the findings of [7], respectively. On the other hand, 
profitability and beta have no significant relationship with 
the risk reporting. Table 4 reports that the highest 
correlation was between audit quality and firm size at 
0.444. The second highest correlation was between firm 
size and leverage at 0.409. Overall, the correlation 
coefficients in our results are less than 0.7; hence they are 
not a concern. Therefore, multicollinearity is not an issue in 
the regression procedure. 
TABLE 4: Pearson Correlation Matrix between Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1-RD 1       
2-BoardQ 0.248*** 1      
3-AQ 0.157*** 0.094** 1     
4- Size 0.356*** 0.203***  0.444*** 1    
5-ROE 0.057 0.011 0.258*** 0.245*** 1   
6- Lev 0.193*** 0.071 0.123*** 0.409*** -0.197*** 1  
7-Beta  0.006 -0.093* -0.165*** -0.160*** -0.331*** 0.246*** 1 
  
Statistics Regression Results 
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In order to test our hypothesis and to handle the bias of 
omitted variables, pooled OLS regression is used as the 
main test in this study. Table 5 shows the results of the 
different regression models performed. In model 1, we test 
the impact of board quality on the risk reporting. As 
hypothesized, there is a significant and positive impact of 
board quality on the risk reporting at the 1% significance 
level with coefficients of 0.0683. This result suggests that 
the quality of the board plays a vital role in controlling the 
opportunistic behavior of management by means of 
effective monitoring and control mechanisms that reduce 
the information asymmetry and agency costs. This result is 
in line with agency theory and the findings of [9, 12] in term 
of board size; [18, 20] in term of board independence; [22] 
in term of interlocking directors, and [33]in term of board 
meetings. Therefore, the result supports our hypothesis. 
Moreover, the firm size and beta have significant positive 
impacts on risk reporting. The result of firm size is 
consistent with the findings of [2, 11], while beta result 
contradicts the findings of [6, 19]. 
 
 
TABLE 5: Regression Results 
Regression Models Model 1  Model 2   Model 3 Model 4   Model 5   
Dependent Variable RD MRD VRD FRD NFRD 
BoardQ 0.0683*** 0.0432** 0.0826** 0.0443** 0.0820** 
                                    2.68 2.19 2.19 2.09 2.18 
AQ 0.0181 0.0334*** 0.0094 0.0488*** 0.0006 
 1.31 3.64 0.46 4.79 0.03 
Size 0.0315*** 0.0095** 0.0441*** 0.0137*** 0.0416*** 
 5.90 2.14 5.29 2.79 4.98 
ROE                              0.0340 -0.0332 0.0724 -0.0371 0.0746 
                                    0.61 -1.37 0.91 -1.10 0.99 
Lev 0.0456 0.0869*** 0.0220 0.1151*** 0.0058 
                                    1.06 3.14 0.35 3.72 0.09 
Beta 0.0634** 0.0067 0.0958** 0.0049 0.0968** 
 2.35 0.37 2.45 0.25 2.52 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant                            -0.0587 0.5350*** -0.3980** 0.3520*** -0.2934 
                                    -0.48 5.06 -2.10 2.99 -1.54 
N                        423 423 423 423 423 
R-squared                           0.334 0.264 0.285 0.379 0.259 
Adjusted R-squared                  0.308 0.235 0.256 0.355 0.230 
Notes: RD is the level of risk reporting based on index; 
MRD is the level of mandatory risk reporting based on 
index; VRD is the level of voluntary risk reporting based 
on index; FRD is the level of financial risk reporting based 
on index; NFRD is the level of non-financial risk reporting 
based on index; BoardQ represents board quality based on 
index (which covers board size, board independent 
directors, interlocking directors, and board meetings); AQ 
is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm 
is audited by one of the Big Four auditors, 0 otherwise; Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets; ROE is net profit 
scaled by total assets; Lev is the total debt scaled over total 
assets; and beta represents systematic risk which is 
calculated over 12 months by regressing the share price 
against the respective market index. 
 In order to confirm the robustness of the result, we 
re-estimate the multiple regression analysis for the initial 
model by examining the relationships between the board 
quality and the different types of risk disclosures; namely: 
mandatory versus voluntary and financial versus non-
financial. The results of the regression analysis show that 
there is a positive and significant relationship between the 
board quality and the level of mandatory, voluntary, 
financial, and non-financial risk reporting at p<0.05. These 
results imply that the extent of mandatory, voluntary, 
financial, and non-financial risk reporting increase as the 
quality of the board increases. These findings regarding 
different types of risk reporting are consistent with the main 
deduction from this research study (Model 1). Accordingly, 
these findings support the hypothesis developed in this 
study as board quality helps to enhance the level of different 




Using self-constructed index of board quality and a 
comprehensive RD index, we developed pooled OLS 
regression model to test the influence of board quality on 
the risk reporting of the publicly traded non-financial 
companies in Saudi Arabia over the period from 2015–
2018. The result indicates that the quality of the board of 
directors has a positive and significant effect on the extent 
of risk reporting. In addition, the decomposition of the risk 
reporting index into various risk reporting types 
demonstrates the robustness of the results. 
 This research therefore contributes significantly to 
the literature, as it is the first study to examine the 
relationship between the impact of board quality on risk 
reporting of the publicly traded non-financial firms in Saudi 
Arabia. This adds value to the literature on risk reporting 
and corporate governance mechanisms as it provides 
insight into the most significant determinants of risk 
reporting, which is the quality of board of directors. The 
finding reported in this research is also beneficial for 
regulators of the capital market because our finding 
indicates that the quality of the board of directors adds 
value to the companies and helps to improve their 
transparency. This conclusion might be used by regulators 
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to put in place some regulations in order to enhance the 
confidence of the investors and potential investors, 
especially foreign ones, in the Saudi stock market and the 
Saudi economy as a whole and attract more investments.  
 As with all the research studies, and despite the 
contributions made by the study outlined in this research, 
this study has some limitations that provide opportunities 
for future research. First, the sample used for this study 
consists of Saudi non-financial listed companies only; 
hence, this research could be studied extensively and in 
compliance with its regulatory framework. By expanding 
the study to financial firms and/or the geographical and 
economic boundary such as GCC region, it may provide a 
comprehensive knowledge of the phenomenon of risk 
reporting. Thus, studies that will be focused on other sectors 
or on broader boundary economic will help in 
understanding the full picture of the determinants of the 
level of risk disclosure as well as the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms. Furthermore, it will 
help to unveil any similarities between the companies in 
those countries and those in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, this 
study only investigated the relationship between board 
quality and risk reporting for the period between 2015 to 
2018. Therefore, future studies may investigate this 
relationship for more than four years in order to have a 
wider time frame to ensure the consistency of the findings. 
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